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ABSTRACT 
  
The selection of immigrants by skill and education is a central issue in the analysis of 
immigration. Since highly educated immigrants tend to be more successful in host 
country labour markets and less of a fiscal cost it is important to know what determines 
the skill-selectivity of immigration. In this paper we examine the proportions of highly 
educated among migrants from around 80 source countries who were observed as 
immigrants in each of 29 OECD countries in 2000/1.  We develop a variant of the Roy 
model to estimate the determinants of educational selectivity by source and destination 
country. Two key findings emerge. One is that the effects of the skill premium, which is 
at the core of the Roy model, can be observed only after we take account of poverty 
constraints operating in source countries. The other is that cultural similarities and 
physical distance are often more important determinants of the proportion of high 
educated immigrants from a source country to an OECD destination than wage incentives 
or policy.  
 
Acknowledgements: We appreciate the help of Jean-Christophe Dumont who supplied 
some of the data used in this paper and also the help of Jonathan Temple and Rob Wells. 
This paper is part of the CEPR Project on Migration and Mobility of Labour supported by 
the EU research network on Politics, Economics and Global Governance: the European 
Dimensions.  
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Introduction 
In this paper we examine, and attempt to explain, the selection of immigrants by 
education to OECD countries from a wide range of source countries. The immigration 
literature has been much concerned with the mechanisms involved in immigrant 
selection, including economic incentives, immigration policy filters and constraints 
operating in source countries. The debate has been fuelled by concerns about the 
performance of immigrants in developed country labour markets and the general finding 
that the higher are the skills of immigrants, the higher are their earnings and employment 
probabilities, the more positive is their net fiscal contribution and the more positive is 
public opinion towards them and towards immigration more generally. Not surprisingly a 
number of leading immigration countries have moved towards greater skill selection in 
their immigration policies.  
These trends have been accompanied by renewed interest in the ‘brain drain’. The 
gradual increase in migration from poor to rich countries, together with trends in skill-
selective immigration policy, have given rise to concerns that some of the poorest 
countries are being disadvantaged as their best and brightest leave to seek employment in 
high-wage OECD countries. The recent debate has focused on whether the process of 
high skilled emigration improves education incentives in poor countries, thereby 
replacing some or all of the highly educated emigrants. It has also dwelt at length on 
whether the size and composition of diasporas influence development through generating 
remittances and creating trade as well as through return migration and technological 
transfer. By contrast, relatively few studies have focused on what explains the 
educational selectivity of out-migration across source countries and what combination of 
incentives and policy determines the skill content of immigration among the main 
destinations.     
 The basic framework used in models of skill selection is the Roy model (Roy, 
1951), which was introduced to the literature on international migration in a series of 
influential papers by Borjas (1987, 1994, 1999). The essence of the Roy model is 
illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the destination and origin wage-by-skill schedules 
(assumed to be in present values) facing potential emigrants. In this illustration, the 
destination wage schedule, w(y), is increasing in the individual’s skill or education level 
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with a slope that reflects the return to education. If the wage schedule in the origin 
country is w(x)1, the return to education is lower in the origin than at the destination. 
Only those with an education level exceeding s1 will have an incentive to migrate and 
hence there will be positive selection. By contrast if the origin wage schedule is w(x)2 
then only those with education below s2 will emigrate and there will be negative 
selection.  
 The position of the home country reservation wage schedule w(x) depends on a 
number of other factors that can be considered as costs. One is the individual’s preference 
for (or compensating differential in favour of) the home country, which may differ across 
individuals thereby introducing greater heterogeneity into selection by skill. A second 
component is the direct cost of migration, which also displaces w(x) upwards and may 
vary by skill level. A third is the cost associated with gaining admission through the 
policy filter, which could vary across individuals and by skill level. Finally, some 
individuals may be constrained from migrating by poverty, an issue to which we return 
below. Two points follow from this analysis. One is that even if the wage schedule in 
country y lies everywhere above the wage schedule in x (country x is much poorer) the 
other components may still ensure that the reservation wage schedule crosses the 
destination wage schedule. Thus selection can still be important even when income gaps 
are large. The second point is that these other components may influence the slope of the 
reservation wage schedule w(x) so that the relative slopes of the ‘raw’ (or unadjusted) 
wage schedules may not be a good guide to the skill-selectivity of migration from x to y.  
 In his studies using this framework Borjas (1987, 1992, 1994, 1999) finds that the 
adjusted wage differential for recent immigrants to the US depends negatively on source 
country inequality and positively on average source country income, which implies that 
immigrants from poor and unequal countries are negatively selected relative to 
immigrants from other source countries. Comparison between the US and Canada 
suggests that immigration policies might also matter as more skill-selective policies in the 
latter are associated with better immigrant labour market outcomes (Borjas 1993). But 
this appears to operate largely through the source country composition of immigration 
rather than through differences in the selectivity of migrants from a given source country 
(Borjas 1993; Antecol et al., 2003). 
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 More recently, attention has focused on micro-level comparisons of movers and 
stayers, where the probability of migration is related to the estimated return to skills at 
home and abroad. Using this approach Ramos (1992) and Borjas (2008) find that 
migrants from Puerto Rico to the US have less education than non-migrants and that 
returnees are somewhat less educated than out-migrants. This is consistent with higher 
returns to education in Puerto Rico as compared with the US, where there are no 
immigration policy barriers between the two countries. However in a study of 32 source 
countries Feliciano (2005) finds that Puerto Rico is the only country for which migrants 
to the US are negatively selected on education relative to the source population. This 
suggests that the presence of immigration policy increases positive selection, although 
there is still a weak negative relationship between the degree of positive selection and 
source country inequality.   Interestingly, Aydemir (2003) finds that, for migration from 
the US to Canada, the high-educated are less likely to apply but are more likely to be 
accepted through Canada’s points system. Overall they are positively selected because 
the effect of skill-selective immigration policy outweighs the incentive effect that would 
otherwise favour low skilled migration.  
Much of the recent attention has focused on the large flow across the southern US 
border from Mexico, a much poorer country with a higher return to skills. Estimating the 
wage distribution for migrants had they stayed in Mexico, Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) 
find that migrants are drawn disproportionately from the middle and upper middle of the 
income distribution and that they are over-represented among those with 10-15 years of 
education (see also Orrenius and Zovodny, 2006; Caponi, 2007). This could be accounted 
for by the low-educated facing higher migration costs, which in terms of Figure 1, could 
make the reservation wage function w(x) convex. Other studies have stressed the effects 
of migration networks in reducing costs and increasing the returns to migration. Thus 
McKenzie and Rapoport (2009) find that networks identified in the source country 
increase the proportion of low educated migrants, while Munshi (2003) identifies the 
positive effects of networks at the destination on the employment probabilities and the 
occupational status of Mexican immigrants. Moraga (2008) finds that a combination of 
network effects and wealth constraints explains the selection of migrants from rural 
Mexico. 
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 These studies have provided much insight into migrant self-selection at the micro-
level. They stress the fact that migration costs are important and that policy barriers could 
be important in raising the costs e.g. of illegal migration. But they offer little insight into 
the observed differences in the selectivity of migration across countries of immigration. 
Less still do they explain why the skill-or education-content of emigration differs so 
much among countries of origin.  
 By contrast the educational content of emigration has been the central focus of the 
literature on the ‘brain drain’. Recent advances in data collection have improved the 
measurement of the brain drain. By looking at the foreign born by origin country and 
education in the censuses or population registers of OECD countries it has been possible 
to assemble a much clearer picture of the migrant stock by education for a range of 
source countries. These datasets have been used to test the competing hypotheses of brain 
drain and brain gain. Following Mountford (1997) they have sought to estimate whether 
an increase in the prospects of emigration could increase the incentive to acquire human 
capital by enough to raise education levels even among those who, in the event, stay at 
home (the brain gain). In a series of studies Beine et al. (2001, 2003) find a positive effect 
of skilled migration on the share educated (migrants plus non-migrants) across a set of 
source countries. They estimate significant educational offsets although some countries 
that are small, relatively poor and have high emigration rates still suffer substantial net 
losses of human capital (particularly countries in the Caribbean and in Sub-Saharan 
Africa—see Docquier (2006), p. 38). While these studies are important in assessing key 
consequences of the brain drain, they are concerned with its effects rather than its causes; 
indeed the theoretical model of migration is one where those who attain a threshold 
education level are randomly chosen for emigration.  
 Here we focus on the factors that drive the educational selectivity of migration 
across both sources and destinations—something that has been neglected until recently. 
However in a recent paper Docquier et al. (2006) estimate models of migration to OECD 
countries by skill level. Their focus is on the concentration among OECD destinations of 
(the stock of) migrants from different source countries. For both tertiary-educated and 
low-educated migrants they find that the concentration in a destination decreases with 
distance from the source and increases with former colonial links, with linguistic and 
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cultural proximity, and with the size and prosperity of the destination. Interestingly they 
find that high-educated migration is more responsive to distance and economic incentives 
while unskilled migrants tend to be more sensitive to colonial ties and linguistic barriers 
and more responsive to the generosity of welfare programs in destination countries.  
Brücker and Defoort (2006) investigate the determinants of skill selectivity using 
data for immigration flows by education level to 6 OECD countries over the period 1975-
2000. They use the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality and include a series of 
measures of geographical and cultural distances between countries. They find a positive 
correlation between inequality in the sending country (measured by the gini coefficient) 
and the immigration selectivity, which is a priori inconsistent with the Roy model. Our 
data show a similar pattern, as we will show in the next section. They introduce an 
extended version of the Roy model where they allow for a negative correlation between 
skill levels and individual moving costs. This extended model predicts than immigration 
selectivity could increase with inequality and, therefore, reconcile the theory with the 
evidence. However, they do not directly test this assumption.  
Grogger and Hanson (2008) examine the stock of immigrants by level of 
education by source country and OECD destination country for 2000/1. They estimate 
separate equations for the educational selectivity of migration and for the sorting of 
migrants between sources and destinations. They focus on absolute wage gaps between 
countries at the low and high end of the wage distribution. In the selection model they 
find that the relative wage effects are consistent with the predictions of the Roy model. In 
addition positive selectivity is positively associated with sharing a common language and 
with distance and negatively with contiguity and with colonial links. Immigration policy 
is proxied by the share of asylum seekers, which is negative for both the educational 
selection of migrants and sorting across destinations.  
 In what follows we use a dataset similar to that analysed by Docquier et al (2006) 
and Grogger and Hanson (2008) which counts migrants to the OECD by destination, by 
source and by education level. We use the framework of the Roy model and we focus 
particularly more on educational selectivity from the source country perspective and on 
the effects if immigration policies in OECD destinations.   
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Educational Selectivity by Source and Destination 
 Our measures of the educational selectivity of migration are based on a dataset 
constructed at the OECD by Dumont and Lemaître (2004). This covers the stock of 
foreign-born in all OECD countries in 2000/01 from all source countries by three levels 
of education and is discussed in more detail in the data appendix. Here we focus on the 
share of migrants aged 15 and over that has some tertiary education, which we label as 
the high educated.  
Table 1 looks at these migrants from the destination country perspective. The first 
column shows each destination country’s share of the foreign born aged 15 and over in 
the OECD. The United States is by far the largest host country with 41.7 percent of the 
total, while other traditional immigration countries, Australia, Canada and New Zealand 
account for a further 13.0 percent. The EU-15 accounts for 37.4 percent of the OECD 
total with Germany the largest individual host country followed by France and the UK. 
Other countries in Eastern Europe and elsewhere contribute modestly to the total. The 
second column shows, for each country, the percentage of the population aged 15 and 
over that is foreign-born. As is well-known, Australia, Canada and New Zealand have 
immigrant shares of over 20 percent--rates that are matched only by Switzerland and 
Luxembourg. Less well known is the fact that seven other members of the EU-15 have 
immigrant shares that are over 10 percent and only little less that the United States at 14.3 
percent. 
The third column of Table 1 reports the percentage of the foreign-born in each 
host country that is tertiary educated. Among the countries with skill-selective points 
systems, Canada, and Australia have ratios of 37-38 percent, which are especially high 
when compared with European countries many of which have ratios of less than 20 
percent. Notable exceptions in Europe are the UK and Ireland, while Norway and 
Sweden also have ratios of over 20 percent. Outside of Europe there are high ratios for 
some countries with very low immigration such as Japan. Korea and Mexico which have 
relatively few source countries (in the case of Mexico 70 percent are US-born).  
Clearly, the education content of a destination country’s immigration depends in 
part on the shares of different source countries in total migration. Column (4) shows the 
result of applying source country immigration weights to the high-education share of the 
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residents aged 15 and over in the source countries, taken from Barro and Lee (2000). 
Although this does not count the emigrants as part of the source country population, it 
gives an indication of the extent to which each destination draws migrants from relatively 
high-education sources. As is well known, the proportions of high-educated are much 
lower in the source country populations than they are for migrants, and the variation of 
this weighted average across destinations is also somewhat less then among migrants. 
However the correlation coefficient between columns (4) and (5) is only 0.47, suggesting 
that more than half of the variation across destination is due to factors other than source 
country composition. These include destination-specific factors such wage incentives and 
immigration policy as well as bilateral selection effects associated with cultural links and 
distance.  
Table 2 examines migrants to the OECD from the perspective of the source 
region. The first column shows the percentage of OECD immigrant stock that is 
accounted for by different source regions. A large proportion (46 percent) of these are 
intra-OECD migrants, while in terms of continents, 29.5 percent come from the 
Americas, 35.3 percent come from Europe (including the former Soviet Union) and 24.4 
percent come from Asia (including the Middle East). The second column shows for each 
sending region the percentage of its emigrants that are high educated. As might be 
expected, the ratios are relatively high (30 percent or above) for North America, 
Australia/New Zealand and Northwestern Europe. But the education content is also high 
for emigrants from most of Asia, from the former Soviet Union and from Sub-Saharan 
Africa. To some degree this is reflected by the (migrant weighted) percentages of high 
educated residing in each region’s source countries (column 3). Although the correlation 
coefficient between columns between columns (2) and (3) is 0.5, there are substantial 
deviations. For countries in Asia and Africa the high-educated share among emigrants is 
far higher than that of the source country populations—a result that remains true even 
when the emigrants are added back to the source populations. In some other cases such as 
Central America, Southern Europe and North America the gap between emigrants and 
source country populations is small or even negative. These comparisons immediately 
raise the question of how such large differences in educational selection across countries 
and regions can be accounted for.  
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Before moving to a more formal analysis of these data, it is worth looking to see 
if the relationships suggested by the Roy model can be observed in crude correlations on 
country-level data. Migration studies often use the gini coefficient of household income 
as a proxy for the return to skills. However this variable is far from ideal as it measures 
income from all sources and it reflects the proportions at each income level. Instead we 
have constructed a measure of the return to skill based on wage rates for different 
occupations from Freeman and Oostendorp’s (2001) dataset (see data appendix). Figure 2 
provides scatter plots of the relationship between the share of high-educated immigrants 
by destination (Table 1 column 3) and the destination country skill premium. The Roy 
model predicts that this relationship should be upward sloping. Figure 2 shows that there 
is very little relationship between the education content of immigration and destination 
skill premium. Thus the effects of incentives on selection by education are not easily 
observed across OECD destinations.1 However, as we have noted above, such effects 
might be masked by differences in the source country composition of immigration and/or 
by differences in immigration policy.  
The relationship between the skill content of migration and economic incentives 
should be more clearly observed by comparing those who have emigrated from source 
countries with those who stayed. Figure 3 plots the percentage point difference between 
the high-educated shares of movers and stayers (the country-level equivalents to the ratio 
of columns (2) and (3) in Table 2) against our measure of the wage premium. According 
to the Roy model, this relationship should be downward sloping: the greater the source 
country wage premium, the lower the proportion of high-educated emigrants relative to 
non-emigrants.   The result is even more disconcerting for the Roy model. As Figure 3 
shows, the relationship is strongly upward sloping. Thus either the Roy model is not a 
very good characterisation of migrant selection at the global level or else the effects of 
economic incentives are being obscured by other influences. In order to investigate this 
further we first outline a model of how such influences might operate.          
 
                                                 
1
 We did a similar comparison using the gini coefficient of household income as a measure of the return to 
skills. This also produced little evidence of a strong positive relationship. The correlation coefficient 
between our measure and the gini coefficient is 0.41 and is significant at the 1% level.  
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Theoretical Framework 
Selection by skill has been a central focus of much of the literature that employs 
some variant of the Roy model. Here we use a modified version of this framework. We 
characterise the probability that an individual migrates as depending on three 
components. The first is the probability that the individual finds it in his or her interest to 
migrate on cost-benefit grounds. The second is immigration policy through which 
migrants are screened. And third there is selection at the origin, arising from the fact that 
some individuals may be too poor to afford the costs of migration. 
The incentive for individual i to migrate, Ii, is the difference between the utility 
from the economic gains and the non-economic loss or compensating differential. 
ixiyii zUUI −−=           (1) 
where Uy and Ux are economic utility at the destination and the origin respectively and z 
is the compensating differential representing the individual’s non-economic preferences, 
all assumed to be in present value terms. In order to capture heterogeneity in individual 
preferences we assume that zi is a random variable with mean 0>z  reflecting a positive 
average preference for the origin country. Assuming logarithmic utility we can express 
the incentive to migrate as  
ixiyii zcwwI −+−= )ln(ln , or i
xi
xiyii z
w
c
wwI −+−−= )1ln(lnln    (2) 
where wy and wx are earnings in the destination and origin respectively and c is the direct 
cost of migration.  
Earnings in origin and destination depend on education and a random unobserved 
productivity component, while earnings at the destination also depend on a term 
representing the ‘cultural’ distance between the origin and the destination: 
xiixi sw εααln 10 ++= , and yiiiyi susw ε)ββ(ββln 3210 +−−+=    (3) 
where si is individual i’s education level, which we assume is bounded by 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 (later 
we will assign the value 1 to the high educated and 0 to the low educated). We assume 
that the unobserved components of the wage εx and εy have mean zero and are 
uncorrelated with the individual’s preference for migration. The term u is a measure of 
‘cultural distance’ between the source and the destination that affects the transferability 
of educational skills. The greater the cultural distance the less transferable are these skills 
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and therefore the lower is the wage in the destination. High education may help bridge 
the culture gap so that if β3 > 0 the wage penalty is lower for the more highly educated. 
On the other hand cultural difference may have smaller effects on productivity in low 
education jobs where there is little human capital to be transferred, in which case β3 < 0. 
We characterise the direct cost of migration simply as )1( isd γ− , where d is a 
measure of the direct costs, which decline with education level. Hence the individual’s 
incentive to migrate is: 
iixiyiiii zsddususI −+−−++−−+−= 1321100 γεεββ)αβ(αβ    (4) 
Immigration policy acts as a screen and it may be skill selective. We interpret 
immigration policy as raising the costs of migration such that the policy cost for 
individual i is: 
ii sP 10 δ−δ=           (5) 
If policy is not skill-selective then δ1 = 0.  An across-the-board toughening in policy 
raises the policy cost of immigration by increasing δ0, while an increase in skill-
selectivity holding overall toughness constant can be achieved increasing both δ0 and δ1. 
 An important feature of our model is the poverty constraint; people living close to 
subsistence find it much more difficult to migrate. While it might seem possible to 
borrow, it will be difficult to provide collateral based on future earnings when the 
purpose of the loan is to leave the country.  Thus, the greater are the migration costs, the 
higher is the general incidence of poverty in the origin country, and the more likely a 
given individual is to be poor, the less likely that he/she will be able to migrate. We 
express the poverty constraint effect as the product of these three factors: 
)1( iii srCR −=           (6) 
where r is the general poverty rate and Ci represents the total cost of migration including 
both the direct cost and the policy cost. These costs could be prohibitive for a low 
educated individual in a poor country facing sufficiently high migration costs. 
Substituting direct and policy costs as defined above, the poverty cost can be expressed 
as: 
)1())(( 110 iii srsddR −δ+γ−δ+=         (7) 
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Provided that the sum of migration costs is positive, the poverty cost Ri is increasing in 
the poverty rate and decreasing in s up to s = 1. Putting together the incentive to migrate, 
the policy cost and the poverty cost, the probability that individual i will migrate is: 
)εε)1())δγ(δ(
)δγβαβ(βδαβPr()1Pr(
10
13112000
yixiiii
ii
zsrsdd
sduudm
−+>−+++−
+++−+−−−−==
   (8) 
We characterise the total migration rate as depending on these variables such that:  
zsrsdd
sduud
N
M
T
T
−−+++−
+++−+−−−−=
)1())δγ(δ(
)δγβαβ(βδαβ
10
13112000
    (9) 
where s is the mean of si . We assume two education levels, high educated, si = 1, and 
low educated, si = 0, and thus s is the share of high-educated in the population. The 
migration rate for high-educated individuals is:  
zduud
N
M
H
H
−+++−+−−−−= 13112000 δγβαββδαβ     (10) 
And the migration rate for low-educated individuals is 
zrdud
N
M
L
L
−+−−−−−= )δ(βδαβ 02000       (11) 
Thus the difference between the migration rates of the high- and the low-educated is:  
rddu
N
M
N
M
L
L
H
H )δ(δγβαβ 011311 +++++−=−      (12) 
As in the Roy model, an increase in the return to skills in the destination relative 
to the origin increases positive selection. In this specific case, an increase in β1 – α1 
increases migration among the high educated but not among the low educated.  Cultural 
distance affects selection through β3, which could be positive or negative.  Positive 
selection is also related to direct migration costs through dγ1 and through the policy 
selectivity term δ1. Finally, the degree of poverty, r, reduces unskilled migration and 
therefore increases positive selection, both directly and through the interaction with 
migration costs.  
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Estimating framework and data 
We use the theoretical approach above to motivate an empirical model of migrant 
selectivity from country x to country y by specifying the following estimating equation: 
yxyxyx
xyxyx
Lx
Hx
Ly
Hy
Tx
Hx
Tyx
Hyx
PolaPovDista
PovaDistaCulta
w
w
w
w
aa
N
N
M
M
η++×+
+++−+=












65
43210
)(
)ln(lnln
 (13) 
The dependent variable is the log of the share of high educated in the total migration from 
x to y divided by the share of high educated in the population of origin country x. This 
measures the educational selectivity of migration from x to y. The first of the explanatory 
variables is the difference in the wage premium for high over low educated workers 
between the destination and source countries. The basic test of the Roy model is that a1 > 
0.  Because of the restriction imposed on the two wage ratios this variable varies by 
origin and by destination. The second term is cultural distance which is specific to each 
country pair and which could be positive or negative in sign. The distance between x and 
y, which varies across bilateral pairs, is a proxy for direct migration costs. Since these are 
less of a deterrent to the high educated we expect that a3 > 0.  
The fourth and fifth terms capture the poverty constraint that affects the low 
educated in poor countries. The effect of poverty is to increase high education selectivity, 
the more so the higher are the costs of migration.   Hence we expect a4 > 0 and a5 > 0. 
The interacted term varies by source and destination but the poverty rate varies only by 
the origin country. Selective immigration policy, Poly, is destination specific and it may 
be skill selective. We first capture this with a dummy for each destination country, which 
will also absorb any other destination-specific effects.  But further below we investigate 
some direct measures of skill selective immigration policy.2  
  The data that we use for the numerator of our dependent variable is the share of 
migrants aged over 15 from a source country to an OECD destination country that have 
some tertiary education.  As noted earlier, this stock data for the year 2000 comes from 
                                                 
2
 The theory set out in the previous section considers only one destination but in our empirical model we 
estimate migration from a given source country to a number of different destinations. Third country effects 
could potentially matter but, if cross-destination effects are symmetric, the alternatives to any given 
destination are constant across sources and can be absorbed by the destination dummy.  
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Dumont and Lemaître (2004). The denominator is the share of the source country 
population aged 15 and over with some tertiary education in 2000, based on the Barro 
and Lee (2000) database. In order to obtain the population at risk, we add back the 
emigrants to the OECD to the source country numbers of high-educated and total 
emigrants to the Barro-Lee estimates for each source country.  
As noted earlier we measure the skill premium using wage rates rather than 
relying on the gini coefficient of household income, which has often been used as a 
measure of the return to skills. Our measure of the skill premium is the ratio of the wage 
in a set of occupations that normally require some tertiary education to the wage in a set 
of unskilled occupations. These are calculated from Freeman and Oostendorp and cover 
the years 1983 to 2003. The percentage in poverty is the World Bank’s estimate of the 
proportion of population living with incomes of less than $2 per day for the available 
year nearest to 2000. Because this is only available for a recent year and because of 
missing data we develop an alternative measure of poverty using the share of agriculture 
in GDP. Across the source countries in our data for which the World Bank poverty share 
is non-zero the correlation between poverty and the agricultural share in 2000 is 0.85. For 
our alternative poverty measure we apply the prediction from a regression of the $2 per 
day poverty rate on the agricultural share to the average agricultural share over the years 
1950 to 2000. One advantage is that this reflects average poverty levels for the period 
over which almost all of the migration took place.  
The costs of migration are reflected in the distance between the capitals of the 
source and destination countries. Variables that are intended capture the cultural distance 
between the source and the destination include dummies for having a common official or 
primary language and having a post-colonial relationship. We also include a measure of 
linguistic proximity, which is based on the number of nodes between one language and 
another on the linguistic tree. Further details of the definition and sources of the variables 
can be found in the data appendix.  
 
Results for Educational Selection  
Our estimates of different variants of the model appear in Table 3. Column (1) 
shows the results for a baseline specification that includes the wage premium differential 
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and the variables that reflect geographical and cultural distance between the source and 
destination countries, but excluding the destination country dummies. This produces a 
negative coefficient on the wage premium differential, which is the opposite of what the 
Roy model would predict, although it is not significant. When the destination dummies 
are included in column (2) we find that the coefficient becomes positive although it 
remains small and insignificant. One reason is that, across source countries, the wage 
premium is positively correlated with poverty. Thus the source country wage ratio would 
be capturing a mixture of the ‘true’ negative effect on selection through the wage 
premium and the positive selection effect operating through the poverty constraint. 
 The third column of the table adds controls for the World Bank’s $2 per day 
poverty rate and the interaction between distance and poverty. Our model predicts that 
the effect of poverty should matter more the further away the source country is from the 
destination country and so both the main effect and the interaction should take positive 
coefficients.  The results strongly support the hypothesis that poverty matters. We find 
that the estimates of a4 and a5 are both positive and significant, that is, poor countries are 
associated with more positive selection and the further away they are the stronger is this 
effect. Introducing these poverty variables has a dramatic effect on the coefficient of the 
wage premium differential, which now has the predicted sign and is strongly significant. 
That is, controlling for poverty, we find that source countries with a higher wage 
premium are associated with more negative selection. More precisely, the estimated 
elasticity of skill selection with respect to the wage premium differential is around 0.37.  
Column (4) uses instead our measure of poverty imputed from the agricultural share. This 
expands the number of available observations and it produces results that are similar to 
those in column (3) using the direct measure of poverty.  
 As noted earlier we have no clear prediction for the effects of cultural distance. 
On the one hand high education may make it easier to bridge the cultural gap, in which 
case cultural distance should lead to positive skill selection. On the other hand for the 
lower educated with fewer skills to transfer, cultural distance may be less of a barrier, in 
which case it may lead to negative selection. The results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 
3 suggest that the transferability of human capital may be highly sensitive to the sharing 
of a common language; and that cultural proximity does not necessarily enhance the 
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transferability of human capital but reduces the costs of migration for low-skilled workers 
more than for high-skilled workers. The negative effect of colonial history may reflect the 
long-term effects of the initially low barriers to immigration from post-independence 
colonies that generated persistent streams of low-skilled migrants.  Finally, distance has a 
positive coefficient, as we would expect, even in the presence of the interaction with 
poverty. Thus migration costs increase positive selection, but more so for poor source 
countries.  
The results so far suggest a strong role for poverty in explaining the patterns of 
skill selection, and we explore this further by looking at poor and rich countries 
separately. We label source countries as “poor” if their poverty rate is higher than 10% 
and as “rich” if their poverty rate is smaller than 5%.3 We then estimate the model 
separately for each of these two groups. For the poor countries, we estimate a model with 
and without the poverty variables, to identify precisely the role played by poverty in skill 
selection. The results are reported in Table 4. These results confirm our previous 
findings. The elasticity of skill selection with respect to the wage premium differential is 
twice as large in rich countries as in poor countries, when we do not control for poverty 
rates. Once we do (column (3)), we find a coefficient for the wage premium differential 
that is comparable to the one for rich countries and we find that poverty itself also 
increases positive selection. The results with the imputed poverty rates (column (4)) are 
very similar to those with the poverty variables, as we found earlier.  
 
The Effects of Policy in Destination Countries 
As noted above, selective immigration policies can be viewed as a screening mechanism 
that imposes differential costs on potential immigrants by skill and education. 
Unfortunately we have no comprehensive indicator of the degree of selection across 
destination countries. While policies with a bias towards employment rather than family 
reunification are widely believed to increase positive selection, there are no cross country 
measures of such policies. Also, the degree to which foreign qualifications and skills are 
recognised in the host country must also be considered as part of selective policy. 
                                                 
3
 We experimented with alternative classifications of countries and found very similar results. 
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We use three indicators of skill-selective policy. The first is based on data from 
the World Competitiveness Yearbook, which reports the responses of business executives 
to a question on how far immigration policies permit the hiring of foreign employees. We 
interpret greater flexibility as representing more-employment friendly policy. The second 
relates to the restrictiveness of the country’s policy towards professional workers 
(Nguyen Hong, 2000). We convert some of the components relating to migrants not a 
measure of the ease with which professionals can be employed. The third indicator is the 
share of foreign citizens among students in the country’s tertiary education sector in the 
late 1990s. This is intended to capture the conversion of foreign students into highly 
educated immigrants. Each of these measures was converted to an index with zero mean 
and unit standard deviation (across destination countries). The three indices are added to 
produce a combined index of skill-selective policy.  
A further measure that is sometimes used is the share of asylum seekers in total 
immigration. If asylum seekers have lower education than the average immigrant, more 
permissive asylum policies should reduce educational selectivity. We construct an index 
of the share of migrants who were not refugees over the period 1990 to 1999 as an 
additional measure of skill selective policy. This also is adjusted to have a cross-country 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Further details of the sources used in 
constructing these indices are provided in the data appendix. Unfortunately our measures 
of policy are incomplete for Mexico and the Eastern European countries and so we lose 
these destinations from our sample.  
  The regressions presented in Table 5 include policy indices in place of the 
destination country dummies, but are otherwise equivalent to column (4) of Table 3.  
Note that the coefficients on the non-policy variables are little changed by the exclusion 
of the destination dummies. In the first column the combined policy index is positive as 
expected but significant only at the 10 percent level. In the second column the refugee 
share is added to the equation and this takes the opposite sign to what would be expected. 
When the three components of the selective policy index are included separately those 
representing employment flexibility and low restrictions on professionals are 
significantly positive while the foreign student index is positive but insignificant. Finally, 
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when the share of non-refugees is added in column (4), it remains negative and it 
weakens the coefficient on employment flexibility.  
 The results reported here are the first to investigate the influence of direct 
measures of skill-selective policy. While there is some evidence that such policy matters 
the effects are not particularly robust. Among the different components, the ease with 
which professionals can transfer their skills appear to be the most important—an effect 
that probably reflects more widely the transferability of specific skills. By contrast the 
effect of a smaller refugee share is perverse. Given that, in part, this reflects the number 
who choose to apply for asylum, a higher share of refugees may reflect employment 
prospects in the chosen country.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have examined, and attempted to explain, the selection by 
education of immigrants from a wide variety of source countries into the countries of the 
OECD. Since the labour market quality of immigrants is of increasing concern to 
developed-country governments, it is important to know what are the key forces 
determining the educational selectivity of immigration. Although considerable research 
has been devoted to differences in selection and outcomes for immigrants to a given 
destination (usually the US) there have been few attempts to analyse this selection across 
source and destination countries. As a result it has not been possible to fully explore the 
predictions of standard migration theory. 
Broadly speaking our results contain four main findings. The first relates to the 
Roy model, which predicts that the greater the return to skills in the destination as 
compared to the source country, the stronger will be the positive selection of immigrants 
by skill-level.  This effect is not observed in the simplest model but it reappears once we 
allow for the fact that many potential immigrants in poor counties are constrained from 
migrating by poverty. This explains the paradox that migrants from poor countries, where 
the returns to education and skills are large, are strongly positively selected from among 
the source country populations.  
Following from this, the second finding is that the costs and constraints are 
important in shaping the selectivity of migration. Distance, which reflects the costs of 
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migration, and poverty, which reflects liquidity constraints, are both associated with more 
highly educated migration streams. A further implication suggested by theory is that the 
poverty constraint should bite harder where migration costs are higher. Our results 
strongly support the hypothesis that the interaction between poverty and distance further 
increases skill selectivity from a given source country.  
The third main finding is that cultural differences are important but that their 
effects on skill selection are ambiguous. On hand sharing a common official language 
with a destination country increases the educational selectivity of migration. This may be 
because professional skills and qualifications can more easily be translated into the host 
country environment. On the other hand linguistic proximity has a negative effect. This 
may be because low-skill migrants are more able to function effectively where the 
linguistic distance is not too great. It is important to note also that colonial ties remain 
important even after accounting for linguistic similarities. This may reflect ‘second 
language effects’ or it may be the persistent results of postcolonial policies that gave 
preferential access to unskilled migrants from former colonies.  
Finally we have investigated the effects of skill selective immigration policies in 
destination countries. Although our measures of selective policy are imperfect they do 
attempt to capture elements of post-immigration policy that affect the transferability of 
skills. While these policies work in the expected direction, their effects are not 
particularly robust. And in addition the share of non-refugees, which has been used in 
some other studies, fails to give the expected sign once the other determinants of skill 
selection are taken into account. Thus, more definitive conclusions about the effects of 
policy on skill selection must await the development of more comprehensive indicators of 
policy.   
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Table 1:  Immigration to the OECD 
Host Country Code 
(1) 
 
Percent of 
OECD 
Migrant Stock 
(2) 
 
 
Percent 
Foreign-born 
(3) 
 
Percent of  
Foreign-born 
Hi-Educated 
(4) 
Weighted 
Source 
Country Hi-
Educated 
Australia AUS 5.1 26.9 37.9 16.4
Austria AUT 1.2 13.8 11.3 11.6
Belgium BEL 1.3 12.0 17.4 12.7
Canada CAN 7.0 22.4 38.0 13.5
Switzerland CHE 2.0 24.7 18.6 13.7
Czech Republic CZE 0.6 5.2 12.5 11.5
Germany DEU 10.4 13.4 14.9 11.4
Denmark DNK 0.4 7.5 19.4 13.2
Spain ESP 2.4 5.9 21.8 12.8
Finland FIN 0.1 2.7 18.9 15.9
France FRA 7.4 11.7 18.1 9.2
United Kingdom GBR 5.9 9.5 30.5 12.3
Greece GRC 1.3 10.8 15.3 13.9
Hungary HUN 0.4 3.2 19.8 10.1
Ireland IRL 0.4 11.0 38.7 18.8
Italy ITA 2.7 4.1 12.2 13.0
Japan JPN 1.5 1.1 24.2 17.6
South Korea KOR 0.2 0.4 32.2 11.7
Luxembourg LUX 0.2 36.6 18.3 15.3
Mexico MEX 0.3 0.4 37.1 29.3
Netherlands NLD 1.6 9.6 17.6 9.9
Norway NOR 0.4 8.1 22.3 14.2
New Zealand NZL 0.8 22.5 27.3 15.4
Poland POL 1.0 2.4 11.7 15.8
Portugal PRT 0.8 6.7 19.3 7.8
Slovak Republic SVK 0.2 2.7 14.7 11.6
Sweden SWE 1.2 14.4 22.3 13.9
Turkey TUR 1.5 2.4 14.3 15.9
United States USA 41.7 14.3 25.9 12.6
Notes: Cols 1-4 based on data underlying Dumont and Lemaître (2004); Col 5 calculated from Barro and 
Lee (2000). The high education share of countries missing in the Barro and Lee data are imputed as the 
(population weighted) average of the other countries in the region.  
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Table 2: Migrants to the OECD by Region 
World Region 
(1) 
 
Percent of 
Migrants to 
OECD 
(2) 
Percent 
High 
Educated 
Migrants 
(3) 
Source 
Region 
Percent Hi- 
Educated 
North America 2.7 43.1 51.5 
Central America 14.8 6.9 10.2 
Caribbean 7.0 19.8 7.8 
South America 5.0 25.9 12.9 
Scandinavia 1.1 31.9 21.4 
UK and Ireland 5.7 36.0 19.9 
Western Europe 8.5 29.5 17.1 
Southern Europe 7.4 12.6 14.4 
Eastern Europe 9.5 17.7 10.6 
Former Soviet Union 3.1 32.5 16.3 
East Asia 7.0 41.0 14.6 
Southeast Asia 6.9 34.3 12.0 
South Asia 4.9 41.8 3.4 
Middle East 5.6 21.2 9.7 
North Africa 5.1 18.1 4.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.2 32.7 2.4 
Pacific Islands 0.5 18.7 4.6 
Australia and New Zealand 1.0 41.4 37.7 
Notes: Cols 1-2 based on data underlying Dumont and Lemaitre (2004); data classified only by regions that 
are broader than those in the table or are classified as Other are excluded.  Col 3 calculated from Barro and 
Lee (2000); the high education share of countries missing in the Barro and Lee data are imputed as the 
(population weighted) average of the other countries in the region.  
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Table 3: Determinants of skill selection  
Dependent variable: Log (share of high skilled migrants / share of high skilled) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(poverty 
imputed) 
Log wage premium differential  
(destination – source) 
-0.003 
(0.055) 
0.062    
(0.054) 
0.369 
(0.052)** 
0.334 
(0.048)** 
Common official or primary 
language 
0.670 
(0.089)** 
0.802 
(0.087)** 
0.647 
(0.076)** 
0.665 
(0.071)** 
Linguistic proximity -0.087 
(0.016)** 
-0.128 
(0.016)** 
-0.128 
(0.014)** 
-0.117 
(0.013)** 
Colonial relationship post 1945 0.284 
(0.098)** 
-0.030 
(0.105) 
-0.512 
(0.095)** 
-0.432 
(0.086)** 
Distance (most populated cities, 
1,000 km) 
0.102 
(0.005)** 
0.124 
(0.006)** 
0.053 
(0.007)** 
0.054 
(0.006)** 
Share of poverty    0.006 
(0.002)* 
0.008 
(0.002)* 
Distance × share in poverty   0.002 
(0.000)** 
0.002 
(0.000)** 
Constant -0.173 
(0.043)** 
-0.824 
(0.130)** 
0.102 
(0.130) 
0.093 
(0.119) 
Observations 1438 1438 1438 1719 
R-squared 0.30 0.39 0.55 0.54 
Country of destination dummies NO YES YES YES 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. In column (4) the poverty 
rate is imputed from the share of the labour force in agriculture.  The dependent variable is weighted by the 
corresponding total number of migrants from the source country to the destination country.  
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Table 4: Determinants of skill selection – Poor versus rich countries 
Dependent variable: Log (share of high skilled migrants / share of high skilled) 
 
 (1) 
Rich 
countries 
(poverty 
rate < 5%) 
(2) 
Poor 
countries 
(poverty 
rate >10%) 
(3) 
Poor 
countries 
(poverty 
rate >10%) 
(4) 
Poor 
countries 
(poverty 
rate >10%) 
Log wage premium differential  
(destination – source) 
0.373 
(0.104)** 
0.226 
(0.072)** 
0.389 
(0.058)** 
0.386 
(0.052)** 
Common official or primary 
language 
0.589 
(0.088)** 
1.326 
(0.184)** 
0.831 
(0.161)** 
0.953 
(0.137)** 
Linguistic proximity -0.186 
(0.020)** 
-0.104 
(0.034)** 
-0.175 
(0.028)** 
-0.149 
(0.024)** 
Colonial relationship post 1945 - -1.346 
(0.157)** 
-0.953 
(0.129)** 
-0.973 
(0.107)** 
Distance (most populated cities, 
1,000 km) 
0.029 
(0.007)** 
0.176 
(0.011)** 
0.094 
(0.018)** 
0.105 
(0.016)** 
Share of poverty    0.034 
(0.004)** 
0.036 
(0.003)** 
Distance × share in poverty   0.0002 
(0.0005) 
-0.0003 
(0.0004) 
Constant 0.671 
(0.134)** 
0.099 
(0.232) 
-0.478 
(0.220)* 
-0.387 
(0.186)* 
Observations 563 738 768 977 
R-squared 0.46 0.61 0.75 0.73 
Country of destination dummies YES YES YES YES 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. In column (4) the poverty 
rate is imputed from the share of the labour force in agriculture. The dependent variable is weighted by the 
corresponding total number of migrants from the source country to the destination country. 
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Table 5: The effects of selective immigration policy on skill selection  
Dependent variable: Log (share of high skilled migrants / share of high skilled) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log wage premium differential  
(destination – source) 
0.190 
(0.052)** 
0.248 
(0.051)** 
0.211 
(0.051)** 
0.252 
(0.051)** 
Common official or primary 
language 
0.621 
(0.072)** 
0.619 
(0.075)** 
0.614 
(0.076)** 
0.611 
(0.075)** 
Linguistic proximity -0.082 
(0.014)** 
-0.084 
(0.014)** 
-0.083 
(0.014)** 
-0.083 
(0.014)** 
Colonial relationship post 1945 -0.186 
(0.086)* 
-0.285 
(0.086)** 
-0.233 
(0.084)* 
-0.291 
(0.086)** 
Distance (most populated cities, 
1,000 km) 
0.055 
(0.005)** 
0.065 
(0.005)** 
0.056 
(0.005)** 
0.064 
(0.005)** 
Share of poverty  0.006 
(0.002)** 
0.009 
(0.002)** 
0.006 
(0.002)** 
0.009 
(0.002)** 
Distance × share in poverty 0.002 
(0.000)** 
0.001 
(0.000)** 
0.002 
(0.000)** 
0.001 
(0.000) ** 
Selective policy 0.037 
(0.015)* 
0.015 
(0.015) 
  
Flexibility   0.118 
(0.038)** 
0.044 
(0.040) 
Low restrictions on 
professionals 
  0.158 
(0.036)** 
0.100 
(0.036)** 
Foreign student share   0.068 
(0.038) 
0.024 
(0.039) 
Non-refugee share  -0.240 
(0.033)** 
 -0.211 
(0.035)** 
Constant -0.137 
(0.044) 
-0.149 
(0.043)** 
-0.149 
(0.046) 
-0.158 
(0.047) 
Observations 1520 1520 1520 1520 
R-squared 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.48 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. In these regressions the 
poverty rate is imputed from the share of the labour force in agriculture.  The dependent variable is 
weighted by the corresponding total number of migrants from the source country to the destination country.  
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Data Appendix 
Migrant skills. The data that we use for immigrants is that constructed at the OECD by 
Dumont and Lemaître (2004), as noted in the text. Our measure of migrant skills is the 
share of the foreign born aged 15 and above having some tertiary education. Education is 
classified into four levels: high, medium, low and unknown. We take the high educated 
as a share of the total, assuming that those for whom education is unknown would be 
either low or medium educated. Taking the high educated as a share of those for whom 
the education level is known makes very little difference to the results reported above. 
This share is available by source country for each OECD destination although in a few 
cases some of the source countries are aggregated together by region. In the regression 
analysis we use only the observations for individual source countries.  
Source country skills. In order to calculate the share of high educated in each source 
country we take the number aged 15 and over with some post-secondary education in the 
year 2000 from Barro and Lee (2000), available at: 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html. For those source countries that are 
represented in the data on migrants but not in the Barro and Lee data, we have imputed 
the number of high educated by applying the average ratio of high educated in other 
countries in the same region, using the regions listed in Table 2. The countries omitted in 
Barro and Lee are generally very small and are not likely to affect our results. In order to 
obtain the population at risk we add back the emigrants by skill level so that the base 
population for each source country includes those who have emigrated. This assumes that 
emigration of the highly educated does not generate more education among those who 
did not emigrate. If there is an educational response, as some of the recent literature 
suggests, then our calculation will overestimate the counterfactual no-migration skill ratio 
in the base population. If on the other hand we assume complete offset then the 
appropriate ratio would be the same as in the unadjusted Barro and Lee data (although the 
absolute numbers would differ).  
Skill premium. We use data from the Occupation Wages around the World database, 
constructed by Freeman and Oostendorp (2000), available at http://www.nber.org/oww/. 
The data include standardized wage information for 161 occupations in over 150 
countries from 1983 to 2003 and is based on the ILO October Inquiry that asks 
governments to yearly report wages for a wide range of occupations. The ILO dataset is 
not directly usable because of the lack of comparability in reported wage formats across 
countries and over time. Freeman and Oostendorp corrected the data in such a way that 
wages could be made comparable across occupations, countries and over time.  
Given that occupations may differ in their skill requirements across countries, we choose 
to construct a skill premium measure based on occupations that are either highly-skilled 
(and do require at least some tertiary education) and unskilled occupations, which 
according to the ILO description “require a minimum of training or no previous 
experience”.  We calculated a premium for each country and year, based on the average 
wages in all available occupations in each skill level. We use the country average over 
the period 1983-2003 as a measure of the skill premium. While this goes some way 
towards capturing the skill premium over the longer run, it must be noted that there are 
missing values for certain country/years. For Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, 
Japan, Switzerland and the Slovak Republic, where insufficient observations are available 
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we used the predicted value of the premium based on a regression of the premium on the 
gini coefficient in 20 OECD destination countries.  
Poverty. The proportion of the source country population living on less than $2 per day 
comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2006 at: 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/Section2.htm. These measures are for a 
single year between 1995 and 2003. The imputed poverty measure corresponds to the 
predicted value of poverty from a linear regression of poverty on the average share of 
agriculture in GDP over 1950-2000.  Share of Agriculture in GDP from World Bank, 
average share for the years 1950-2000. 
Distance. Distance in kilometres between capital cities, taken from Centre d’Etudes 
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, at: 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
Common language dummy. Dummy equal to 1 for pairs of countries sharing a common 
official language. Source: Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales 
Language proximity. Values from 1 to 5 calculated from the number of common nodes in 
the linguistic tree between the closest official languages of pairs of countries (based on 
the language classification tree of the Ethnologue).  
Colonial links. Dummy equal to 1 for pairs sharing a colonial link after 1945. Source : 
Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales. 
Employment flexibility. Based on survey responses of business executives where 0 
corresponds to the statement “immigration laws prevent the company from hiring foreign 
employees” and 10 corresponds to the statement “immigration laws do not prevent the 
company from hiring foreign employees.” This is taken from the International Institute of 
for Management Development, World Competitiveness Yearbook (Lausanne: IMD) for 
the years 1992, 1994, and 1997-2000 and adjusted to zero mean and unit standard 
deviation.  
Low restrictions on professionals.  Data from worksheets underlying the study by 
Nguyen Hong (2000) of restrictions on trade in professional services, covering 
professionals in engineering, architecture, accountancy and law.  The subset of indicators 
used here are those on policy rules in each sector related to  nationality or citizenship 
requirements, permanent residence, quotas on foreign professionals, accreditation, 
licensing and business ownership. Numerical indices for each profession (higher numbers 
reflecting more permissive policy) were then averaged over the four professions to give a 
single value for each country. 
 Foreign student share. Taken from the OECD, Education at a Glance (Paris: OECD) for 
the years 1995, 1998 and 2000. The share of foreign citizens among those in tertiary 
education is averaged over these years and converted to mean zero and unit standard 
deviation.  
Non-refugee share. The number admitted as refugees (the number accepted, not the 
number of applicants) in 1990-1999 is taken from various issues of the United Nations 
Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Statistical Yearbook (Geneva: UNHCR). The total 
number of immigrants admitted in 1990-1999 is taken from various issues of OECD, 
International Migration Outlook (Paris OECD). The average share of non-refugees in 
total migration was converted to mean zero and unit standard deviation.       
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Source: See text.  
Source: See text 
 
Fig 2: Percent of Immigrants High Educated and Wage Premium, 
OECD Countries 2001
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Figure 3: Difference between High Education Percent for Emigrants 
and  Non-Emigrants and Wage Premium, Source Countries 2001
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